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  Abstract 
 Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” and “The Black Cat” have each 
garnered a large amount of criticism from many different fields of study. However, it 
seems that many critics prefer to analyze these stories separately and refrain from 
critiquing the two together. In addition to this, it seems that these two stories have also 
avoided criticism from the field of animal studies. In my thesis, I attempt to combine 
these two stories through the lens of animal studies in a way that reveals the stories’ plots 
as, in certain regards, inversions of each other. Through my analysis, I argue that, while 
these stories reflect a particular historical moment and the problems therein, they still 
underscore some of the roots that these problems grew out of. These roots that are 
exhibited in the two stories still seem to exist today and manifest through the problematic 
presentation of the human-animal binary, the muddling and ignoring of the fluidity of 
both animal and human subjectivity, and the lack of acknowledgement of different types 
subjectivity. 
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I. Introduction 
 Noted as one of the first writers to have created “crime fiction,” it is no surprise 
that many of Edgar Allan Poe’s stories align with legal concerns. Poe not only writes 
stories in which characters are confronted with a mystery that officers of the law attempt 
to unravel, but he also constructs these cases in a way that muddles the way the law is 
interpreted and carried out. While Poe’s ratiocinations most directly focus on crime and 
detective narration, many of Poe’s short stories revolve around a crime and, 
consequently, the law.  In addition to the legal aspects of Poe’s fiction, his narratives 
often focus on or include a range of animal characters. “Hop-Frog; or, the Eight Chained 
Ourang-Outangs,”  “The Murders in Rue Morgue,” “The Black Cat,” and “The Raven” 
are just a small number of such stories.  “The Black Cat” and “The Murders in the Rue 
Morgue,” in particular, offer up two intriguing instances of animals in contact with the 
human legal system. “The Black Cat” exposes human methods of subject making and 
how those methods pertain to animals. It also highlights the perceived differences in the 
treatment of animals and the treatment of humans. “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” 
brings in animals in a way that complicates the manner in which the law applies to 
animals. Similar to how “The Black Cat” addresses issues in defining the liberal subject, 
“The Murders in the Rue Morgue” points out problems in defining the legal subject. 
These narratives underscore how animals as objects complicate the interpretation and 
employment of the law. Through looking at how these stories interact with human 
structures, one can find many comparisons between the two that allow them to be read in 
dialogue with one another. This dialogue is created by way of their divergence from each 
other in the roles of characters. In the case of “The Murders in Rue Morgue,” Poe sets up 
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a narrative in which an Orangutan kills two women, leaving a mystery that leads to the 
question not of finding who the killer is, but if the killer can be legally considered a 
murderer. “The Black Cat,” in contrast, leaves the reader wondering not who committed 
crimes or if there was a crime committed, but which crimes count and which do not. For, 
as the reader sees, the Orangutan goes free after murdering the women, though 
technically he is convicted, and the narrator in “The Black Cat” is sentenced to death for 
murder of his wife, but not convicted for his cruelty towards animals. So, in one story, we 
see a human go unpunished for the murder of an animal. In the other, we have an animal 
escape with impunity for the murder of two humans. 
 My argument analyzes “The Black Cat” on its own first, then I make an argument 
for “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” as a text on its own, and then to conclude my 
argument, I will bring my analyses of both of these stories in unison to show how they 
work together to support my thesis. In regards to “The Black Cat”, I argue that the 
narrator’s denial of all subjects aside from himself obstructs his own conception of 
subjectivity, and therefore his understanding of himself. My analysis of “The Murders in 
the Rue Morgue” mirrors that of “The Black Cat” by showing how humans’ flawed 
perceptions of subjectivity cripples our ability to sort out events in which animals commit 
what might be considered crimes to humans. The narrator’s closing words in “The Black 
Cat” suggest that animals can interact with the law, but do not specify to what extent and 
what role intention plays in these interactions. The questions, then, seem to be these: who 
is wronged, how, by whom, and by what rhetoric are these wrongs justified, convicted, or 
ignored? While these stories reflect a particular historical moment and the problems 
therein, they still underscore some of the roots that these problems grew out of. These 
Wharton 5 
roots that are exhibited in the two stories still seem to exist today and manifest through 
the problematic presentation of the human-animal binary, the muddling and ignoring of 
the fluidity of both animal and human subjectivity, and the lack of acknowledgement of 
different types subjectivity. 
II. Interpretations of “The Black Cat” and “The Murders in the Rue 
Morgue” 
 Many critics have delved into at least one and, at times, many of these questions 
in regards to the stories individually, but criticism pertaining to the two stories together is 
in short supply. Consequently, it seems necessary to mention a few of the scholarly works 
that pertain separately to both of these stories. The most common interpretation of “The 
Black Cat” begins from a psychoanalytic perspective. Roberta Reeder, in “‘The Black 
Cat’ as a Study in Repression” (1974), attributes the narrator’s deplorable actions to a 
repression of his instinctual desires. Forming a dual representation of those desires, the 
wife and the cat are both the objects and symbols of his instinctual desires. Not 
recognizing this connection, the narrator finds himself in a repressive, internal struggle. 
Since the connections have been buried deep within his subconscious, the narrator is 
unable to properly explain his physical and verbal abuse as well as his murder of both the 
cat and his wife. Continuing with the theme of failed coping mechanisms, only in a 
different way, Ed Piacentino explains the narrator’s motive and his inability to explain it 
through a combination of narratological criticism and psychobiographical theory in 
“Poe’s ‘The Black Cat as Psychobiography: Some Reflections on Narratological 
Dynamics” (1998). This combination surfaces through Piacentino showing how the 
narrative techniques the narrator employs reveal and map out his own psychological 
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make up. The narrator “alternate[es] between narritive time and story time” (Piacentino 
158), allowing him to critique his own actions and offer up reasons for his behavior in a 
way that works towards his own benefit. While he believes this will draw the sympathy 
of the reader, it actually betrays his own lack of mental stability. Piacentino’s article finds 
much of its foundation in the work of James W. Gargano in “Poe’s ‘The Black Cat’: 
Perverseness Reconsidered” (1960), an article considered by many to be the “premier 
essay on ‘The Black Cat’” (Piacentino 153). A portion of my own argument on “The 
Black Cat” is also based in Gargano’s argument. So, for the time being, it will suffice to 
summarize Gargano’s piece as arguing that the narrator’s susceptibility to evil is deeply 
rooted in his “unhealthy overdevelopment of the voluptuary side of his nature” indulging 
selfishly and ambivalently “in a world of private gratifications” (Gargano 173). This 
overdevelopment occurred during the narrator’s childhood where he avoided interactions 
with other humans in favor of his pets. His primary interactions, then, were based off of a 
relationship void of affect, sought only for the sake of self-gratification. 
 The criticism concerning “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” is slightly less 
concentrated within specific fields and instead spreads through multiple critical 
perspectives. In “‘To Make Venus Vanish’: Misogyny as Motive in Poe’s ‘The Murders 
in the Rue Morgue,’” Joseph Church writes from a feminist perspective. Arguing against 
more contemporary scholars that support a view of Poe as a more progressive writer, 
Church asserts that “Poe and his avatars such as Dupin work to punish and silence 
womankind in the world and its correlatives in the mind that threaten a masculinist 
ontology” (Church 409). The primary basis for his claim finds its roots in the unpunished 
murders of the women combined with the rewarding of the man responsible for the 
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animal that committed the murders. Edward Kozaczka, in “Death as Truth in Edgar Allan 
Poe’s ‘The Murders in the Rue Morgue,’” finds a different significance in the death of the 
two women. Seeing Dupin as the inviolate male, Kozaczka argues that Dupin uses the 
erotic tension between himself and the narrator to both use the narrator as a text while 
also place himself outside of both desire and ontological questioning. The deceased 
women obstruct his control of the narrative because he cannot determine the nature of 
their cohabitation. Thus, in his quest to discover the whole truth, he fails to find the 
answer to the question that poses the largest threat to his power. The women’s death, and 
resultant inability to voice the nature of their relationship, renders him powerless in 
ascertaining the truth behind the women’s living situation. Focusing on the presence of 
voice as opposed to the absence, Paul Jahshan offers a Derridian reading of voice in “The 
Deferred Voice in ‘The Murders in the Rude Morgue’” (2002). Jahshan views Poe’s story 
as an allegory for both the deferred voice, the voice of “the real before” that is 
marginalized, and “the apparent now”, or the act of reading the text (79). Jahshan 
examines many of the voices in the text, but primarily focuses on the difference between 
the narrator’s act of writing the events into being and how this is in some ways dependent 
on and in other ways overshadowed by the readers process of reading the story into the 
“apparent now”. By doing this, the reader brings the events of the story into the present. 
 As one can see, both of these stories have a considerably large basis of existing 
scholarship. These stories have not only merited a scholarship from a large amount of 
scholars, but they have also garnered criticism from many different fields of study. While 
a bulk of criticism on Poe’s stories come from feminist or psychoanalytic scholars, it 
seems that many scholars find his work to allow for many different types of readings. 
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Considering this, I find that there is still room for different theoretical analyses within the 
body of work already done on Poe’s stories. I also find that, while there is a large amount 
of criticism concerning each individual text, few theorists have proposed viewing the two 
stories together. Consequently, I wish to not only bring analyses of these two stories 
together, but also to contribute to the body of work existent from a perspective “The 
Black Cat” and “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” seem to have for the most part 
avoided: animal studies. 
III. Constructing a Dialogue Between Animal Studies and Biopolitics 
 Considering the prominence of animals in these two stories, it is surprising that 
the field of animal studies has not weighed in more significantly in analyzing these 
narratives. Colleen Glenney Boggs seems to be the only scholar that has devoted a 
significant amount of space towards analyzing these two stories from an animal studies 
perspective. In Animalia Americana: Animal Representations and Biopolitical 
Subjectivity (2013), Boggs brings together a host of seemingly unrelated or oppositional 
theories and ideas into a dialogue that maps out and sorts through the question of “what is 
the cultural and political work of animal representations” (3). On a more general scale, 
Boggs does this through bringing the schools of biopolitical theory and animal studies 
into a conversation with one another. After plotting out the progression of the theories 
she employs, she uses critical analyses to show how historical events and literary texts 
support the addition she wishes to make to both biopolitical theory and animal studies 
and the way they work together. Instead of using these sources to frame a theoretical 
argument, I would like to, in a way, do the opposite of what she does. The purpose of her 
book seems to be furthering our understanding of biopilitics and how it realates to animal 
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studies. The purpose of my own paper is to apply her additions to these fields to “The 
Black Cat” and “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” in order to extend the field of Poe 
criticism, instead of biopolitics and animal studies. I differentiate my argument from hers 
in the way that I combine the two stories and examine them as inversions of eachother. 
Boggs, while making some connections between the two stories, examines them 
primarily as separate from each other. In addition to this, the connecting line she draws 
between the two stories is created through the theme animal love, a theme I diverge from. 
While her argument towards connecting the stories through animal love and bestiality is 
expertly displayed, I find the stories to be more connected through their connections 
between animals and the law. Primarily, I would like to employ the theoretical foundation 
she lays to analyze “The Black Cat” and “The Murders in Rue Morgue” as co-texts that 
show how human ideas of subjectivity and the language of the law objectify animals in a 
way that justifies their abuse by humans while also placing them in a position of privilege 
that grants them a certain amount of agency with and immunity from the powers of the 
state. Consequently, her criticism on “The Black Cat” and “The Murders in Rue Morgue” 
is important and directly related to my own topic, but also the theoretical work 
established through her book is the primary basis of my own argument. Consequently, it 
is necessary to go more in depth on her work than I have on other pieces concerning these 
two stories.  
 Boggs begins her book by looking into how the field of animal studies is divided 
between ethical, animal-rights arguments and post-structuralist arguments. The division 
is not so much a division of conflict but a division of interest. The animal-rights section 
of animal studies argues for an inclusivity that counts animals among the human idea of 
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subject. The post-structuralist portion of animal studies seeks to deconstruct our notion of 
subject altogether through fleshing out the problems that both the physical embodiment 
and symbolic representation of animals cause in the making and unmaking of the liberal 
subject. Instead of focusing on one of these sides, Boggs “places the two approaches in 
dialogue with each other and argues that the way we read subjectivity depends on the 
way we represent the relationship between human beings and animals” (Boggs 4).  
While the animal rights portion of animal studies has its own particularities, the 
general nature of its conceptual underpinnings are more easily understood than its post-
structuralist counterpart. Consequently, it is essential to both Boggs’s argument and my 
own to elucidate the complexities that make up the foundation of post-structuralist animal 
studies. Boggs transitions from animal rights to post-structuralism by pointing out that 
the arguments for and against animal rights lack “an understanding of the ways in which 
the liberal subject already depends at its core on a relationship with animals that 
undercuts this binary and that reveals ‘the animal’ as well as ‘the human’ to be a 
‘linguistic, cultural, and sociopolitical construct’” (Boggs 5). Post-structuralism then 
weighs in on this issue in the way that it challenges “the schema of the knowing subject 
and its anthropocentric underpinnings” (Boggs 5) and instead puts an emphasis on 
feeling. This notion, however, Boggs appropriately points out is not implicit or even 
assumed in a typical understanding of post-structuralism. In showing how post-
structuralism relies on the notion of affect, Boggs  employs Rei Terada’s work in Feeling 
in Theory: Emotion After the Death of the Subject (2001). Boggs’s interpretation of 
Terada’s work sees affect as the uniting between the “physiological and the 
psychological” (6), where one only experiences emotion through one’s “acts of 
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interpretation and identification by means of which we feel for others” (6). By placing 
this notion of affect and the question of what counts as other in direct alignment of 
importance with humans’ tendency to both objectify and privilege animals as both beasts 
and sentimentalized companions, Boggs shows how “the subject is not self-sufficient but 
relies on affective relationships that cross the species line” (6).  
It is here that I find my analysis of “The Black Cat” in direct alignment with 
Boggs’s theoretical argument pertaining to the human establishment of the liberal subject. 
However, my argument also stems from the connection she makes between post-
structuralist animal studies and biopolitical theory. The basis of this connection is found 
in the theoretical transition from animal studies into posthumanist studies. Posthumanism, 
Boggs argues, resulted as an alternative to animal studies that patches up some of the 
holes left in the foundation of animal studies. Posthumanism derives from the challenging 
of “Entlightenment models of subjectivity by reflecting on modern technologies’ ability 
to mimic core traits of the human” (Boggs 8). Thus, posthumanism grew from the 
analyses of the ways that developing technology skews our current understanding of the 
separation between “culture and nature, biology and technology” (Boggs 8). What Boggs 
focuses on here is posthumanism’s “commitment to seeing the connections between 
seemingly disparate entities and an attentiveness to embodiment” (8). The symbolic 
weight of embodiment, the bodies engagement within various theoretical discourses, and 
the way that technology interacts and disrupts humanist notions of these concepts seem to 
be at the core of posthumanist study. Boggs, in her theoretical discourse, trades the 
posthumanist interest in technology and how it pertains to our definition of human in 
favor of an interest in cross-speces relationships and how they pertain to our 
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understanding of human. Consequently, her interest shifts “from notions of ‘post’ to the 
concept of ‘inter’, as in ‘intersubjective,’ ‘interrelated,’ ‘interactive,’ [and] ‘interspecies’” 
(9). Even with her added notions to posthumanism, there still exists a dichotomy similar 
to the one existent in animal studies: the difference in “approach based on embodiment 
and one concerned primarily with semiotics” (10). This is imilar to how animal studies is 
divided between a focus on embodiment with animal rights and a focus on semiotics with 
post-structuralism. Posthumanist arguments tend to come from either a space that 
attempts to move past humanity’s anthropocentric ideals through analyzing embodiment 
or a frame that attempts to decenter the human through deconstructing semiotic 
relationships. 
From this, Boggs brings biopolitics into the discussion in the way that its 
transferall “from rights to lives” (10) emulates this tension between semiotic and 
embodied interpretations. Consequently, Boggs believes that “we need to bring animal 
studies and posthumanism in conversation with inquiries into the way biopolitics operates 
in that biopolitics at its core aggregates itself the power to define whose ‘lives’ matter” 
(10), the place that those lives uphold in society, and how that position is embodied. 
While Foucault coined the term biopolitics, Boggs points out that he said comparatively 
little on the actual development of the theory. He did, however, identify “two vectors of 
biopower: one, the anatom-politics of the human body which were “ensured by the 
procedures of power that characterized the disciplines”; and two, “a biopolitics of the 
population” (Boggs 10). One portion of biopolitics, anatomo-politics, relates to the 
individual, and biopolitics represents the population in a combination that surmounts to 
the creation and expression of biopower. Boggs, then, keenly points out that the 
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tautological nature of defining the individual and population through the relation one has 
to the other represents the prime power, weakness, and conceit of biopower. The only 
way the human individual and population are able to define themselves in a non-
tautological way, however, is through the “deliberate exclusion of the nonhuman from the 
realm of political representation” (Boggs 11). Consequently, Boggs argues that “animals 
are integral in two ways to a full understanding of biopolitics. First, the “anatomopolitics 
of the modern state does not limit its reach to human bodies but also exercises power over 
animal bodies; and second, the differentiation between human beings and animals is the 
fundamental mechanism by which biopolitics exerts power” (Boggs 11). Once this is 
understood, one can move on towards seeing how biopower relies upon a presentation of 
species difference in an ambivalent rather than concrete way that allows “for the 
contradictory power to both dissolve and reinscribe borders between humans and 
animals” (Boggs 11) when situations call for such rhetoric.  
It is here that I find how using these ideas can help one understand how “The 
Murders in Rue Morgue” and “The Black Cat” show the ways in which biopower exerts 
its force to muddle interpretations of subjectivity in ways that render the law as both an 
oppressive and inadequate force in its dealings with crimes related to animals. “The 
Black Cat” shows how this pertains to the human, individual subject in its relation to the 
animal. “The Murders in Rue Morgue” shows how these ideas manifest and become 
problematic when animals act with a subjectivity that the language of the law denies. 
This denial results in the law rendering itself incapable of finding an accountable subject 
in the case of certain crimes committed.  
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IV. “The Black Cat” and Crimes against the Non-Human Animal 
Subject 
As mentioned earlier, Bogg’s argues for notions of bestiality within “The Black 
Cat.” She argues that the narrator’s subjectivity is flawed due to a combination of a 
bestial sort of love attachment to his animals and a failure of Lockean pedagogy (116). 
While I find a portion of my argument based in her use of John Locke’s work, I diverge 
from her argument in that I find, instead of bestial love, self love to be the other half of 
the source of the narrator’s flawed subjectivity. In addition to this, Boggs does not find 
motive in the narrator as a result of the animals and his wife objectifying him, as I do. I 
find it appropriate to begin with my analysis of “The Black Cat” before my argument on 
“The Murders in the Rue Morgue”. The narrator’s perversity seems to actually be a 
combination of a flaw in the development of his subjectivity and how that pertains to his 
inability to acknowledge subjectivity that is not his own. The narrator, claiming to be 
sane, wishes to “place before the world, plainly, succinctly, and without comment, a 
series of mere household events” (Poe 381). While he manages to succinctly summarize 
his first few years of marriage, he fails in plainly stating what happened and offers many 
of his own comments. Beginning as a harmless animal lover, the narrator, after a few 
years of marriage, falls prey to intemperance and then descends into an aggressive pattern 
of animal and spousal abuse. The animal abuse reaches a climax when he gouges out the 
eye of his cat and then proceeds to hang it. The story itself ends in the narrator’s murder 
of his wife and his subsequent arrest. He blames his intemperance and the horrendous 
acts on the perversity within all men. However, upon a close inspection of the text, one 
can see that his mental collapse is actually a result of his underdeveloped subjectivity that 
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renders him unable to recognize other living beings as anything other than objects. This 
flawed subjectivity is masked during childhood by his tenderness towards animals and 
estrangement from other humans. It becomes slightly more visible in young adulthood as 
he descends into alcoholism. Finally, it becomes completely apparent when the closest 
objects in his life, his wife and cats, assert themselves as subjects by acting against him. 
His flawed subjectivity can be explained through “a key mechanism of biopolitics 
by which forms of power as seemingly disparate as state authority and familial intimacy 
get conjoined and worked out via animal representations” (Boggs 2). While many aspects 
of biopolitics could lend help in interpreting “The Black Cat,” this one idea of symbolic 
transferalls is what this section of my essay focuses on. Colleen Glenney Boggs, in 
Animalia Americana: Representations and Biopolitical Subjectivity, devotes an entire 
chapter towards analyzing the narrator in “The Black Cat” through such a lens. Boggs 
offers up an image of the narrator as a human unable to fully develop his subjectivity as a 
result of his inability to transfer his childish tenderness towards animals to a matured 
intimacy with other human beings, especially his wife. Boggs explains the basis of her 
literary analyses in her book, arguing that many stories “reveal animal representations to 
be a complex site where the construction of subjectivity occurs by affective means and 
pedagogical methods that hinge on the literal relationships to animals and on their 
figurative representation” (2). Returning to her ideas that subjectivity is developed and 
understood through affective relationships, the reader can understand how the narrator’s 
inability to recognize other subjects, and consequent paralysis of his empathetic 
capabilities, stunts his subjective formulation. The narrator of “The Black Cat” fails to 
feel for others because he sees all others as objects, and, in so doing, undermines his own 
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subjectivity. This renders him unable to understand his wife’s subjectivity. Consequently, 
his view of her is parallel to his view of his pets as objects. 
The foundation for this parallel is set up in the opening paragraph. By 
summarizing the story as “a series of mere household events,” the narrator places himself 
within “the feminized domestic sphere” (Bliss 96). This primes the mind of the reader to 
understand that the following narrative is a masculine representation of events occurring 
in an environment culturally understood to be that of the feminine. However, in the 
following paragraph, the narrator describes his earlier self to be much more feminine than 
masculine.  
From Infancy I was noted for the docility and humanity of 
my disposition. My tenderness of heart was even so 
conspicuous as to make me the jest of my companions. I 
was especially fond of animals, and was indulged by my 
parents with a great variety of pets. With these I spent most 
of my time, and was never so happy as when feeding and 
caressing them. This peculiarity of character grew with my 
growth, and, in my manhood, I derived from it one of my 
principal sources of pleasure. (Poe 382) 
Ann V. Bliss, in “Household Horror: Domestic Masculinity in Poe’s ‘The Black Cat,’” 
mentions how a popular understanding of masculinity clashes with the “nurturing, almost 
maternal, way he cares for his pets” (69). Though his description of himself sounds 
feminine, he refuses to acknowledge his lack of masculinity, claiming that his 
indulgences are only a “peculiarity of character [that] grew with my growth, and, in my 
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manhood” (Poe 382). Bliss finds the man’s motivation for his horrendous acts in his 
inability to appropriate his feminine traits as sensitive masculinity. The narrator is deeply 
disturbed by his feminine traits, and, thus continuously attempts to assert his masculinity 
through alcoholism, aggression, and violence.  
 While Bliss makes a sound argument in support of her thesis, James W. Gargano, 
in “Poe’s ‘The Black Cat’: Perverseness Reconsidered,” finds the narrator’s perverseness 
to be an aggressive manifestation of the narrator’s deeply rooted and long festering 
selfishness and self absorption. Both of these theories, however, seem to aid in the 
interpretation explored throughout my analysis of the short story. This is because 
Gargano introduces another dimension to the narrator’s peculiarities apart from his 
feminine traits. Though the narrator’s treatment of animals manifests in a feminine way, 
it can also be read as an “unhealthy overdevelopment of the voluptuary side of his 
nature” (Gargano 173). Essentially, his self-indulgent behavior is “an abnormality, for it 
thrives on a wanton ignorance of his own ambivalence” (Gargano 173). The negative side 
of his tenderness towards animals lies in his neglect of humans. Readers see this through 
his preference of animals over “the paltry friendship and gossamer fidelity of man” (Poe 
382). The hint that it is primarily self-indulgence, rather than altruism, lays in his 
continuous description of his behavior as indulgent, and the supreme pleasure he receives 
from “feeding and caressing them” (Poe 382). This unchecked self-indulgence and 
unnoticed ambivalence creates a “private world” (Gargano 173) wherein the narrator is 
able to ignore his own deficiencies and avoid the problems the outer world poses to his 
own conception of self.  
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 In this state of self-indulgent tenderness, perceived as femininity, the narrator’s 
subjective growth is stunted. The negative aspects of his actions continue on unnoticed 
because his treatment of animals seemed to go along with what was expected of children. 
The introduction of “The Black Cat” appears to suggest the conception of family 
intimacy begins during the narrator’s childhood where he, like many children during the 
19th century “learn[s] to be human by being taught how to be humane” (Boggs 116) to 
animals. So, at first glance, one might believe the narrator’s original affective relationship 
with animals sets him up to have a healthy affective relationship with humans later on in 
life. However, as mentioned above, this relational transference fails because of its self-
indulgence and false sense of altruism. He loves the animals because they are objects; 
they are possessions present only for his own pleasure. Because of the root of his 
tenderness for animals, “he maintains a literal love of animals and fails to undergo the 
expected process of symbolic transference” (Boggs 117). He cannot transfer his love 
from object to subject because he cannot own the subject. Consequently, if “the subject is 
not self-sufficient but relies on affective relationships” (Boggs 6), then one can see how 
the narrator’s failure to mature in his symbolic transference inhibits him from maturing 
from a childish subjectivity to an adult understanding and expression of his subjectivity.  
 The narrator manages to avoid the consequences of this deficit “for several years” 
until his “general temperament and character-through the instrumentality of the Fiend 
intemperance- had experienced a radical alteration for the worse” (Poe 382). The narrator 
blames this change on intemperance and perverseness. However, his alcoholism seems to 
be a result, not a cause. The true cause is his subconscious realization that he has failed to 
properly mature. He cannot help but notice that “both [his] childlessness and joblessness 
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indicate [his] inability to meet biologically and culturally determined gender 
expectations” (Bliss 97). Having already embodied many feminine traits, his inability to 
manifest his masculinity in two of the more compulsory modes of male duties forces him 
to adopt other methods of asserting his masculinity.  
 His initial attempts surface in the forms of alcoholism and aggression. The 
aggression initially manifests through verbal abuse, irritability, and neglect of others. 
Eventually, this aggression transforms into physical violence to his wife and then his 
pets. However, the only in-depth description of his physical abuse “is hardly an act of 
manly bravado; it is more the behavior of a prepubescent boy” (Bliss 97). Even in his 
deliberate attempts to perform masculinity, he fails. This sends him further into distress 
and frustration. Consequently, his alcoholism worsens. His alcoholism eliminates the few 
fragments of empathy he has left. Empathy was the only string tying him to his animals, 
aside from his own selfishness. With this gone, his selfish, immoral self takes the helm. 
He calls this self “the spirit of perverseness” (Poe 383), separating his own faults from his 
actual self. This perverse self detests the cat for its fear of the narrator, though the 
narrator acknowledges it is his own fault. The alienation of the only affective relationship 
the narrator had left foreshadows the imminent collapse of his subjectivity.  
Considering that the narrator is writing the story after everything has happened, 
one can assume he has already gone mad and is now writing the narrative under the 
influence of a flawed subjectivity. This can be tracked throughout the story, but it is most 
evident once his psychological breakdown has begun. While he intricately describes the 
torture and murder of the first cat, he “glosses over the spousal abuse” (Bliss 97) as well 
as the abuse to his pets. Even his murder of his wife merits only two sentences. Grouping 
Wharton 20 
his wife with the other pets further demonstrates how the narrator has failed to recognize 
his wife as a subjective being and consequently grouped her with the object pets.  
Thus far in the narrative, no character other than the narrator has shown any sort 
of agency. This falls in line with the narrator’s perception of all beings in his life being 
objects, leaving him as the only subject. However, once the narrator gouges out the eye of 
the cat, the cat begins to show a change in the pattern that the narrator cannot avoid 
describing. As mentioned early, the cat “fled in extreme terror at [his] approach” (Poe 
383). The narrator does not see this as fear so much as “evident dislike on the part of a 
creature which had once so loved [him]” (Poe 383). The cat has chosen its own self as a 
subject over the narrator. It has rejected its position as object by expressing free will 
against the narrator. Angered by this, the narrator: 
hung it-because I knew that it loved me, and because I felt 
it had given me no reason of offense;- hung it because I 
knew that in  so doing I was committing a sin- a deadly sin 
that would so jeopardize my immortal soul as to place it- if 
such a thing were possible- even beyond the reach of the 
infinite mercy of the Most Merciful and Most Terrible God 
(Poe 383). 
The action, while horrible, does not warrant this amount of condemnation. As Gargano 
mentions, the narrator’s view of how damnable the hanging of the cat is “would be 
embarrassing even to the most shameless animal lover” (173). This “outrageous excess” 
(Gargano 173) of condemnation suggests the narrator knows he is doing more than just 
killing an animal when he hangs his cat. In a literal sense, he is unjustly murdering a 
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living being. Not only has this creature done nothing to warrant the murder, the creature 
has done the exact opposite. He also was fully conscious of his actions. Committing the 
act in the morning in “cool blood” (Poe 383), the reader understands the narrator was 
sober and not moved by “the fiend of intemperance” (Poe 382). This is the first violent 
act the narrator commits without being under the influence of alcohol. The narrator’s 
soberness shows that he not only has lost all ability to empathize but also that he is as 
aware as he can be of the relationship between the cat and himself. This detail adds a 
symbolic importance to the literal significance of the murder. The narrator has 
acknowledged the cat’s expression of free will. In this acknowledgement, the narrator 
must also recognize the cat’s exit, albeit partial, from the object category and assertion of 
itself as a subject. Outraged by the existence of a subject other than himself, the narrator 
acts to reposition himself as the sole subject. For this reason, the narrator condemns 
himself to such an extreme level.  
 With his last affective relationship completely destroyed, the man’s flawed 
subjectivity has no hope of being repaired. Without feeling for others, the man can only 
feel for himself. Left with only his own thoughts, he slips further into insanity. The 
second cat draws out this insanity. He cannot help but stew on his treachery, especially  
with the cat constantly reminding him of it through “the patch of white that, for the 
narrator, increasingly comes to resemble a gallows” (Bliss 97). It is important to note 
here that the narrator convicts himself through his perception of the cat’s fur. However, 
he displaces his conviction through expressing his anxiety in the form of anger towards 
the cat, rather than guilt centered on himself and his actions. 
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 Instead of showing the failed transferall of affection and morality, like the first 
cat, the second cat shows the consequences of that failure. The narrator is able to justify 
his hatred to the cat through its lack of devotion to him and the wife’s love for it. The 
hatred then, the narrator says, causes him to feel “terror and horror” (Poe 384) from the 
cat’s “loathsome caresses” (384). While the narrator says these negative feelings are a 
result of his hatred, the hatred is actually a result, not a cause. The true cause is the 
reversing of the subject-object binary within the narrator’s world. Notice that, in the 
beginning, the narrator is the one caressing his animals. Never do they caress him or do 
anything to him that he does to them. They are clear object pets and he is the clear subject 
human. Because he never was able to transfer the skills he was supposed to learn through 
being humane to animals to humans, he never understands life outside of subject-object 
relations. With the cat caressing him, he becomes the object and the cat the subject. 
 Consequently, it takes the man’s rage less time to work itself up to commit the act 
of murder. As he descends into the cellar, the cat trips him, causing him to “forget, in 
[his] wrath, the childish dread which had hitherto stayed my hand” (Poe 386). Here, he 
calls his dread “childish” but in actuality, he is unable to act against the cat because of his 
subcoscioius conception of himself as object. Immediately, he remembers his desired 
position and attempts to regain it. Instead of killing his cat, his wife stays his hand which 
causes him to “bur[y] the axe in [her] brain” (Poe 386). He does this because his wife did 
essentially what the first cat did: asserted her own free will in an act contrary to the 
wishes of the narrator. Once again, an object of his has reversed the roles. Consequently, 
he is “goaded, by [her] interference” (Poe 386) into killing her. Once again, however, the 
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reader receives much less detail of the murder than given on the killing and torturing of 
the first cat.  
 Instead, the reader is given an in-depth description of the narrator’s thought 
process on how to hide the body: his thoughts on how to forget both his atrocities and his 
reason for commiting them. He decides “to wall it up in the cellar” (Poe 386). Choosing 
to hide his crime within his own home suggests a symbolic relationship between the 
narrator desired perception of reality and the perception he wishes to ignore. He cannot 
forget either, but he can bury one so deep into his subcoscnious, he can wall it up, so that 
he cannot see it. The wife, who represented the reality the narrator wished to ignore, now 
has been returned to her state as object in the mind of the narrator and killed, so she stays 
there, hidden, so he is not reminded of what once was. 
 The cat, however, has not had any of these things done to it, which is why the 
narrator seeks to destroy it. Believing it to have fled, the narrator is able to “look upon 
[his] future felicity as secured” (Poe 387), with “the guilt of [his] dark deed disturbing 
[him] but little” (Poe 387). However, as the reader soon discovers, the cat is alive and has 
been walled up with the wife. So, instead of pushing his true perceptions into the 
subconscious, dead and unable to escape, the facts he continuously denies are alive and 
able to act, though they may be hidden.  
 In its final assertion of its subjectivity, the cat speaks for the first and only time. 
This is also the only time the narrator gives a voice to any character in the story. He gives 
the cat voice because he must. He must give a voice to the “wailing shriek, half of horror 
and half of triumph, such as might have arisen only out of hell, conjointly from the 
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throats of the damned in their agony and of the demons that exult in the damnation” (Poe 
387). The cat, having exposed the narrator as a murderer, has denied its position as object 
of the narrator. The narrator, then, is left destined for the noose, only able to put his wife 
and pets in their position as his objects through writing.  
 I am interested in these last lines from the narrator for multiple reasons. Chief of 
these is in discerning whom the narrator says this “wailing shriek” comes from. He seems 
to say that it is not just the cat, but that it comes “conjointly from the throats of the 
damned” (387). Who are the damned here? While the narrator could mean many different 
things by this, I find a connection between the voice of the cat and the collective voice of 
those who have been objectified in the way the cat has. Not only this, but also, I find 
specifically that these conjoined voices coming from the throats of those who cannot 
speak in the language of the law. For this reason, the voice shrieks with both horror and 
triumph. The cat is able to alert the police to the man’s crimes. But, which crimes 
actually convict the man? He is not arrested for animal cruelty and murder; he is arrested 
and tried for only the murder of his wife. So, while the cats receive partial justice, they do 
not receive it because they have claimed any damages done to themselves. There is no 
recognition of the oppression the animals have suffered. Even the animals themselves 
cannot fully bear witness to the humans what they have suffered at the hands of their 
owner. Since the police do not know what the man has done to the animals, they could 
not possibly convict the man of anything other than the murder of his wife. So, the man’s 
crimes towards animals technically go unpunished.  
V. “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” and Crimes Committed by the 
Non-Human Animal 
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 In an inversion of the position of the animal, the Orangutan goes unpunished for 
its murder of the women in “The Murders in Rue Morgue.” In this story, we see both how 
the “‘anatomopolitics’ of the modern state does not limit its reach to human bodies but 
also exercises power over animal bodies” (Boggs 11), and how the foundation of 
biopower’s ability to reach in this way also limits its ability to hold animals as 
accountable subjects within human culture. In short, the modern state exerts its power in 
a self-destructive way that leaves many loose ends. This is seen first through the 
confusion as to who committed the murder, the following question of what crime was 
committed, and the consequent aftermath of a double homicide committed by an 
Orangutan. Boggs, in her book, argues that “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” shows 
Poe’s investigation into an argument that places humans “not as the opposite of the 
animal, but as the result of the relationship to another designated as ‘animal’” (126). 
From this argument, the making of human subjectivity is “contingent on the relation to 
‘the animal,’ where both share the same shifting terrain” (126). My argument differs from 
hers in that, instead of using the story to show how human subjectivity is produced in 
reference to the animal, I use the story to show how humans’ view of subjectivity and 
objectivity as they relate to animals is laid out as a concrete thing, but, given the proper 
situation, is treated in a much more fluid way than human structures describe.  
 From the very beginning of the story, the reader’s mind is primed towards 
questioning not only the differences in types of intelligence, but also the validity placed 
upon these types by culture. This comes in the form of the narrator’s seemingly unrelated 
treatise on the difference between acumen and ingenuity: “The analytical power should 
not be confounded with simple ingenuity; for while the analyst is necessarily ingenious, 
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the ingenious man is often remarkably incapable of analysis” (Poe 242). It is important 
here to notice that a hierarchy has been constructed within the claims of the narrator. The 
analyst must be ingenious, but the ingenious is not always capable of analysis. 
Consequently, one who possesses both powers of reasoning is greater than the merely 
ingenious human.  
 This might seem unrelated to my own thesis until the narrator carries on thus: 
The constructive or combining power, by which ingenuity is 
usually manifested, and to which the phrenologists (I believe 
erroneously) have assigned a separate organ, supposing it a 
primitive faculty, has been so frequently seen in those 
whose intellect bordered otherwise on idiocy, as to have 
attracted general observation among writers on morals” (Poe 
242).  
The inclusion of science, specifically phrenology, and moral writers brings the narrator’s 
discourse into dialogue with not only the discourse on human and animal evolution, but 
also with the theory of biopolitics. In calling into question, if not outright discrediting the 
current cultural understanding of what differentiates humans from one another, the 
narrator sets up a foundation for questioning animals’ place in reference to the human 
from the very beginning of the story. Boggs takes this one step further in finding the 
narrator drawing a parallel between Dupin and the orangutan. She points out how the 
narrator parallels the strong man’s enjoyment of physical exercise with the analyst’s 
enjoyment of analysis. Not only is this connection expressed implicitly here, but it is 
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explicitly demonstrated throughout the text in the way that Dupin is consistently lauded 
for his analytical capabilities in the same way that the orangutan is marked by his 
strength. So, while this first portion of the text seems almost entirely unrelated to the 
actual crime narrative, it actually begins the process of questioning the human/animal 
binary in two ways before even bringing an animal into the story. So, the reader begins 
the actual narrative “somewhat in the light of a commentary upon all the propositions just 
advanced” (242), the commentary being an introduction of a discourse of the 
human/animal binary and how it pertains to the law. 
This discourse reveals itself more fully in the newspaper article. The paper gives 
almost every detail available at the crime scene, yet cannot find even a small clue. The 
newspaper has no choice but to acknowledge “a murder so mysterious, and so perplexing, 
in all its particulars, was never before committed in Paris-if indeed a murder has been 
committed at all. The police are entirely at fault-an unusual occurrence in affairs of this 
nature. There is not, however, the shadow of a clew apparent” (Poe 251). Within this 
statement, the reader finds much of the tensions that my argument deals with. The 
witnesses to the event find it so perplexing because of the lack of evidence. However, 
once the evidence is sorted out and the true nature of the event is explained, we find that 
no one but Dupin seems to make any more sense of it than they did before. By the end of 
the story, the witnesses understand how the women died. Yet, they still do not understand 
whether or not “a murder has been committed at all.” It seems the question is even more 
pertinent at the end of the story than at the beginning. For this reason, Boggs astutely 
questions why the paper even is skeptic of the occurrence of murder. I find it important 
here to establish that within murder are the implications of “the capacity for thought” and 
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“the capacity for a temporally forward-looking (afore) thought that carries a moral 
component (malice)” (Boggs 112). The manner in which the corpses are found suggests 
that all of these specifications apply to this situation. In addition to these specifications, 
using the word murder to describe the death of one at the hands of another “implies that a 
legal subject carries it out” (Boggs 112). Nobody sees the murderer, but many claim to 
hear him, implying the presence of a subject. In short, the presence of corpses and the 
nature in which they are found implies that a crime has occurred. The only thing missing 
is an embodied murderer.  
 The accounts given by the witnesses and by the newspaper, however, only relay 
accounts of a disembodied murderer. Only the accounts of a voice heard other than that 
of the two women proves the presence of another being.  These “earwitness” (Boggs 127) 
accounts seem to expose exactly what Boggs points out as the issues residing in 
posthumanism and its correlation to animal representations. Specifically, the way voice 
and communication work in this situation demonstrate the ways in which embodiment 
and representation both combine and diverge within a biopolitical context to both make 
and unmake human structures, the human subject and human law being the two chief 
structures in question here.  
Each of the witnesses describes two voices, assumedly human. Not only do they 
explicitly say they are human, each witness ascribes a nationality and a personality to 
both voices. However, the reader, by the end of the story, knows one to be a human 
animal voice and another to be a non-human animal voice. Boggs describes this mistake 
as a failure “to recognize, to witness tonally, because each attempts to witness 
linguistically” (127). The witnesses have skipped a crucial step in delivering their 
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account in that they skip straight from communication to forms of human language. 
However, the reader understands the speaker to be a non-human animal, and therefore the 
form of communication is tonal, not linguistic. This makes evident the difference 
between the voices themselves and the embodiment of those voices. The implications of 
the voices change when they are embodied. Herein lies the illustration within the story of 
the convergence of the two different posthumanist approaches that focus on either 
embodiment or semiotics, “or, more broadly speaking, information technologies” (Boggs 
10). The information technology here is communication. The voices emit verbal signs 
that the listeners, the “earwitnesses,” are not able to find the proper signifier they relate 
to. The nature of the communication, and even the idea of the sounds being 
communication, or, more specifically, language at all, change once the voices are 
embodied. Without the body to go along with the voice, the witnesses assume that not 
merely a crime, but a murder has been committed. The evident communication that 
everyone hears implies that there was a subject to speak these words. Therefore, a subject 
was present to commit the murders. However, when it is revealed that the voice is 
embodied through an orangutan, the earwitnesses must backtrack slightly. The murderer 
turns from a legal subject to a moral subject. The morality of this instance will be 
discussed later when the sailor’s account is discussed. For the time being, I will limit the 
discussion to how the embodiment of the voice seems to prompt the witnesses to deny 
that there is a true murderer.  
 In contrast to the witnesses and police, Dupin never seems to question whether a 
murder has been committed or not. The women were killed by an act of violence, and 
thus a murder occurred. He never strays from calling the killings murder. Neither does he 
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change the name of the killer from murderer to something else once he proves that it was 
an animal that did the killing. He does not sway from his convictions because, unlike the 
police, he does not “hold the object too close” (252). The wording here is important in 
understanding that, while this sentence’s immediate context refers to something else, the 
text itself points out that the police are holding the animal object too close and 
disregarding the animal subject. Their notions of animal inhibit them from entertaining 
the idea that what they perceive as an obvious murder could have been done by anything 
other than a human. Dupin astutely points this out in showing how “it appears [to him] 
that this mystery is considered insoluble, for the very reason which should cause it to be 
regarded as easy of solution” (Poe 253). It is not that there is a lack of clues, but there is a 
fault in the language of the law employed in investigating the clues that allows ease of 
interpreting them. This fault is the way in which animals are represented and classified 
within the law. 
 By mistaking the structured concepts of society for objective, pre-existent truths, 
all members in the story but Dupin have limited their ability to interpret the clues. Instead 
of this method, Dupin works on the assumption that “all apparent impossibilities must be 
proved to be not such in reality. [So, he] proceeded to think thus-à posteriori. The 
murderers did escape from one of these windows” (Poe 256). Working thus, he 
deconstructs both the clues and the assumptions made by the police to show that not only 
are these “apparent impossibilities” possible, but also the ways in which the methods of 
agents of the state fail. 
 The latter portion of this quote brings me to the next, and perhaps most 
problematic, portion of the issues this story raises. Only a few moments before using the 
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word murderer in the plural, Dupin states that he believes the sailor who owns the 
orangutan is “perhaps not the perpetrator of these butcheries, [but] must have been in 
some measure implicated in their perpetration” and, consequently, “it is probable that he 
is innocent” (Poe 253-254). How then, do we justify Dupin’s suspecting the man is 
innocent while also labeling him as one of the “murderers”? In addition to this, how do 
we explain Dupin’s persistent labeling of the orangutan as a murder when he allows both 
the orangutan and the sailor responsible for it to go free with no qualms? I find Dupin’s 
explanation for these inconsistencies in the following passage: 
You will say, no doubt, using the language of the law, that 
‘to make out my case,’ I should rather undervalue, than 
insist upon a full estimation of the activity required in this 
matter. This may be the practice of the law, but it is not the 
usage of reason. My ultimate object is only the truth. My 
immediate purpose is to lead you to place in juxta-position, 
that very unusual activity of which I have just spoken with 
that very peculiar shrill (or harsh) and unequal voice. (Poe 
258)  
 
Dupin, here speaks specifically towards his explanation of the two voices, but in a more 
broad sense, he speaks about his understanding of the case as a whole. He points out that 
the practices of the law do not always make full use of reason. In saying his ultimate 
object is the truth, he implies that that is not always the goal of the law. In his rhetorical 
process, he attempts to have the narrator justify the voice, the representation, with the 
peculiar way in which the murderer entered the building, or, the evidence of the 
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murderer’s peculiar embodiment. All of this amounts to Dupin subtly stating that the 
language of the law cannot possibly account for an explanation of the nature of the crime 
committed. It cannot because the law has confined itself to relating primarily to human 
subjects. In its dealings with animals, it operates under the assumption that animals are 
objects. Consequently, when animals exhibit agency and assert themselves as subjects, 
such as the way the orangutan does, the law is paralyzed by its own language, limitations, 
and assumptions. The law cannot convict an animal in human language because that is 
not the mode of the animal’s communication. It also cannot do this because animal 
subjects do not exist in the language of the law: the orangutan cannot be a legal subject.  
 While the orangutan may not be capable of murder on a legal level, the text seems 
to suggest it is capable of murder as defined by morality, making the orangutan a moral, 
not a legal, subject. The narrator describes the orangutan’s actions as clearly reactions of 
malice and wrath. It kills both women in a “phrenzy,” “inflamed by the sight of blood,” 
he claws, gnashes, and strikes with “wrath” and “determination” (Poe 265). The language 
used is explicit in showing the murders were thought through, intentional, and done with 
malice or ill intent. Upon seeing the sailor, seeing the only eyewitness, the orangutan 
becomes “conscious of having deserved punishment, [and] seemed desirous of 
concealing its bloody deeds” (Poe 265). The orangutan knows he has done something 
wrong. While the orangutan shows no signs of guilt, it definitely shows that it 
understands it has done something wrong. In addition to this, it further proves this point 
by trying to cover up exactly what it has done wrong. In this reading, one can see how the 
orangutan can be counted as a moral subject.  
Wharton 33 
 Returning to the union of the symbolic and the physical, I would like to look at 
the orangutan’s use of the razor blade in demonstrating how the above statements prove 
themselves in both physical embodiment and in symbolic representation. On a physical 
level, the orangutan is able to behead the old lady via the sailor’s shaving razor. 
Consequently, the sailor, by unintentionally giving the orangutan access to the razor, 
gives the orangutan the power to behead the woman. Yet, we also see the Orangutan does 
not need the razor to kill, because he has no issue in murdering the younger woman with 
his bare hands. Therefore, on a physical level, the orangutan’s power comes from hisself 
and is strengthened through the unintentional carelessness of the human. This correlates 
to the way in which the human population empowers the orangutan to murder without 
accountability to the law. By placing animals in such close proximity to humans, humans 
implicitly place animals in close proximity to the law. The difference, however, is that 
the law applies to subjects only, and can only apply to objects in the way that those 
objects relate to humans. If the animal is object, then it cannot commit crimes on its own. 
Consequently, in the case of murder, humans can be murdered by animals, but animals 
cannot murder humans. The difference lies in that humans must be the subjects of the 
sentence in order for the language of the law to be employed.  
 So, the orangutan, as a subject not acknowledged by the human law, can in truth 
murder, but not in the eyes of the law. For this reason, the orangutan goes free without 
accountability to the law. Yet, the question still remains as to why the sailor, if he is 
responsible for the object animal, is not accountable instead. It has already been noted 
that Dupin suspects the sailor to be innocent of but implicated in the crime, but his words 
to the sailor seem to reveal even more:  
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I perfectly well know that you are innocent of the atrocities in 
the Rue Morgue. It will not do, however, to deny that you are 
in some measure implicated in them . . . . You have done 
nothing which you could have avoided- nothing, certainly, 
which renders you culpable. You were not even guilty of 
robbery, when you might have robbed with impunity. You 
have nothing to conceal. You have no reason for concealment. 
On the other hand, you are bound by every principle of honor 
to confess all you know. An innocent man is imprisoned, 
charged with that crime of which you can point out the 
perpetrator. (Poe 263-264) 
 
Dupin, once again, acknowledges the man’s innocence of the crime. Even the reader can 
agree that the sailor himself did not murder the women. Yet, the sailor was involved in 
the crime. His orangutan murdered the women and his razor was used to murder. Dupin 
keenly acknowledges that there was nothing the sailor could have done to avoid this 
situation. Therefore, the law cannot convict him of a crime. The law cannot count him as 
responsible for the actions of another, especially if, as the text shows, he attempted to 
stop them. The emphasis here is on doing. He has done nothing deserving of conviction. 
But, his object-possession has. If one is responsible for one’s objects, then it is implied 
that the owner is responsible for whatever comes from this object. Consequently, the 
sailor is responsible for the murder. Yet, Dupin understands that the law cannot hold the 
sailor responsible for this object because it has acted outside of its role: it has acted as a 
subject. The sailor can only be responsible for the animal if the animal is an object. Once 
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the animal asserts himself as subject, he can no longer be fully considered a possession of 
the sailor. Consequently, the sailor not only, but cannot be held responsible for the 
orangutan and therefore not responsible for the murders. 
 Simply put, the law in this situation has ignored the animal’s subjectivity as it 
relates to the murdered but acknowledged it in regards to the human accountable for the 
murderer. In this way, we see the dangers of how “biopower hinges on the production of 
species difference as a strategically ambivalent rather than absolute line, allowing for 
contradictory power to both dissolve and reinscribe borders between humans and 
animals” (Boggs 11).  
VI. Non-Human Animals Above and Below the Law 
 Thus, biopower, as it is exerted in these stories, offers an effective tool for 
oppression not only of animals, but also of the humans that both victimize and are 
victimized by such forms of power. In looking at the two stories side by side, three 
common themes surface. The influence of voice, the muddling of subjectivity, and the 
failure of the justice system seem to be the most evident issues that bring the two texts 
together.  
Both stories depict non-human animals using their voices in a fashion that 
problematizes the way in which the other characters and the reader view and deal with 
the animal’s presence. In “The Black Cat,” the voice of the cat seems to cry out for 
justice while at the same time pass judgment on the narrator. Yet, the justice that the cat 
seems to demand is not given. As mentioned earlier, the man is imprisoned and 
condemned to the gallows, but not for his crimes against animals. On one level, the cat 
uses its subjectivity via its voice to take action within the legal system against the 
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narrator. However, on another level, the reader sees the cat hopelessly stating its 
existence with no answer back. The police do not hail the cat in return to its vocalization. 
It is treated by both the police and, ultimately, the narrator, as a coincidence that allows 
the wife’s murderer to be punished. Yet, another murder, the murder of the first cat, goes 
unpunished. In the same way, another murder goes unpunished in “The Murders in the 
Rue Morgue” as a result of humans ignoring non-human animal voices. Here, however, 
the animal is the murderer. The orangutan escapes punishment for the very reason that 
the cat is denied justice: the law cannot acknowledge animals as subjects. Lacking legal 
subject status, the orangutan cannot legally murder. Through this comparison, one sees 
how both animals are not so much outside of the law as much as respectively above and 
below.  
The problems in interpreting the voices of animals in these stories both bleeds 
into and are formed off of the characters’ understanding of subjectivity and who is 
subject and object, and where the privilege lies on either side of the binary. In “The Black 
Cat,” it is clear that the narrator is both the primary subject and the holder of privilege. 
This comes from, and is in part only made possible by, his construction of his private 
world. Both his spousal and animal abuse is rooted in his relationship to the animals. By 
misunderstanding subjectivity and depriving his self of affective relationships, he forces 
both his wife and pets into object positions. The collective view of subjectivity, displayed 
by the police, locks the cats into oppressed object positions, while they grant the wife, 
though she is deceased, subjectivity. Consequently, the cats are below the law in that they 
receive neither justice nor privilege. In contrast, the orangutan’s failure to be hailed as a 
subject grants him privilege in that he avoids judicial punishment. As seen earlier, 
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however, the orangutan’s position diverges from the cat’s in that it is granted, or able to 
take for itself, subjectivity in part. The orangutan having partial subjectivity seems to be 
the only explanation for why the sailor is not convicted of the murders.  
The lack of conviction points out the final, and possibly most important, of these 
three parallels between the two narratives. Placing human animals and non-human 
animals in such close proximity implies that non-human animals will come in contact 
with human law. Both of these stories show how the constructed law as it stands is 
inadequate when dealing with occurrences between humans and animals. By law, animals 
are object possessions. By nature, animals are subjects. Human intervention has placed 
many animals into an odd position of subject-possessions in which animals have a limited 
agency. This limited agency results in animals being morally accountable by the language 
of the law, but not legally accountable. In these stories, crimes cannot be done to animals 
in the same way they can be done to humans. Conversely, animals cannot commit crimes 
against humans in the way that humans can. By placing such ambiguous definitions 
where subjectivity is conveyed as an either or concept, but treated in a more fluid manner 
that accommodates the situation, the language of the law provides for situations where 
heinous crimes are enabled and unpunished. This ambiguity allows the narrator of “The 
Black Cat” to justify the murder of his wife and denies justice to the two women brutally 
murdered in “The Murders in the Rue Morgue.” 
 Both of these stories show human characters attempting to force animals into a 
mold that best fits humanity’s goals. Inevitably these attempts overlap with crime and 
other human defined structures related to the law.  Instead of looking at animals as they 
exist, the characters either choose to or are forced by their own biases to look at animals 
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through the structures of knowing plotted out for them. Consequently, the perceptions of 
both animals and humans are locked into a mode of thought constructed through binaries. 
Through these stories, we see how both animals and humans do not function in a way that 
completely adheres to these binaries. The law is also built off of these binaries and is 
therefore flawed in its application to both humans and animals. However, in the 
presentation of the human-animal binary, the fluidity of both humans’ and animals’ 
relationships with subjectivity is muddled and ignored. Through this muddling, forms of 
power are able to exert themselves in ways that oppress individuals that do not lie on the 
privileged side of these binaries. The analyses employed here need not be limited to just 
these two stories or the work of Poe specifically. In reading animals in a way that 
rethinks our notions of subjectivity, we find ourselves closer to understanding where 
human structures are flawed and consequently where things need to be rethought and 
fixed. In this particular context, a rethinking of subjectivity might lead to a more effective 
legal system: a system that manages to navigate relationships between humans and non-
humans in a more egalitarian way.  
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